Table of Contents - Issue 1 by Chicago-Kent Law Review
Chicago-Kent Law Review
Volume 78




Table of Contents - Issue 1
Chicago-Kent Law Review
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview
Part of the Law Commons
This Front Matter is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Chicago-Kent Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information,
please contact dginsberg@kentlaw.iit.edu.
Recommended Citation




VOLUME 78 2003 NUMBER 1
CONTENTS
SYMPOSIUM:
PRIVATE LAW, PUNISHMENT, AND DISGORGEMENT
SYMPOSIUM EDITOR
ANTHONY J. SEBOK
INTRODUCTION: WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO
SAY THAT A REMEDY PUNISHES? Anthony J. Sebok 3
RESTITUTION'S OUTLAWS Andrew Kull 17
The usual assertion that "restitution is not punitive" is true in the important sense
that liability in restitution does not exceed the defendant's enrichment: enhanced or
exemplary liability is foreign to this area of the law. On the other hand, restitution
incorporates an unmistakably punitive aspect that is given effect in a different fashion:
not by enhancing the liability of a disfavored defendant, but by denying relief to a
disfavored claimant. The traditional explanation of such outcomes (by recitation of
English and Latin maxims) has tended to obscure the extent and the consistency of the
law's punitive response.
OPTIMAL PENALTIES IN CONTRACTS Aaron S. Edlin
and Alan Schwartz 33
Contract law's liquidated damage rules prevent enforcement of contractual dam-
age measures that require the promisor, if it breaches, to transfer to the promisee a
sum that exceeds the net gain the promisee expected to make from performance; but
these rules permit the promisor to transfer less than the promisee's expectation. We
define a contractual damage multiplier as any number between zero and infinity by
which the promisee's expected gain-its expectation interest-is multiplied. Multipli-
ers of one or less thus comply with the liquidated damage rules while multipliers that
exceed one do not; the high multipliers are unenforceable penalties. This Paper shows
that multipliers of any size can be efficient or inefficient, depending on the parties'
purposes in creating them. For example, -a multiplier that exceeds one will decrease
welfare if used by a seller with market power to deter entry, but will increase welfare
if used by parties to induce efficient relation specific investment. As a consequence, a
court should inquire, not into the size of the multiplier, but into the purpose the multi-
plier serves for the parties. The practical implication of this view is that it no longer
should be a sufficient defense to an action to enforce a contractual damage measure
that the parties' multiplier exceeded one.
PUNISHMENT AND DISGORGEMENT AS
CONTRACT REMEDIES Ernest J. Weinrib 55
This Paper examines contract remedies, especially damage awards that are puni-
tive or restitutionary, from the standpoint of corrective justice. The function of the
damage award in corrective justice is to undo, so far as possible, the defendant's viola-
tion of the plaintiff's right. Because the nature of the right determines the nature of
the remedy, a discussion of contract damages requires elucidation of the right in-
fringed by a breach of contract. Drawing on Kant's now almost forgotten discussion
of contractual rights, the Paper sketches the relationship between the promisee's right
to contractual performance and expectation damages, which give the promisee the
value of that right. The Kantian account of contractual right not only justifies expec-
tation damages as compensatory in accordance with corrective justice (thus resolving
the perplexity about expectation damages formulated by Fuller and Perdue), but also
discloses the inaptness of requiring the disgorgement of gains resulting from contract
breach. Turning then to punitive damages, the Paper addresses the question of how
corrective justice and punishment-and the institutions devoted to them-coexist, and
how they are differentiated in a legal order based on rights. It then discusses the
difficulties that emerge from the elaborate but ultimately unsatisfying recent attempt
by the Supreme Court of Canada to work out a coherent treatment of punitive dam-
ages for contract breach.
PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN AMERICAN AND GERMAN LAW -
TENDENCIES TOWARDS APPROXIMATION OF
APPARENTLY IRRECONCILABLE CONCEPTS Volker Behr 105
Nineteenth-century debate on punitive damages has led to an apparently un-
bridgeable gap between American and German concepts of damages. While the
American system stayed dualistic, allowing compensatory damages and punitive dam-
ages, the German system has become monistic, exclusively allowing compensatory
damages. The gap grew deeper as, in America, punitive damages awards skyrocketed,
and in Germany the monistic system, reckoned under German public policy, has
barred American punitive damages awards from enforcement. According to the au-
thor's opinion, recent develop towards capping punitive damages in America and to-
wards awarding damages which are punitive in Germany may bridge this gap.
WHAT DID PUNITIVE DAMAGES Do?
WHY MISUNDERSTANDING THE HISTORY OF
PUNITIVE DAMAGES MATTERS TODAY Anthony J. Sebok 163
In 2001 the Supreme Court, in Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group,
Inc., suggested that, although modern punitive damages punish, in earlier times they
almost exclusively compensated for noneconomic damages that were ignored by a less
progressive legal system. This Article demonstrates that the historical foundation
upon which the Supreme Court bases its argument is groundless. In the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries punitive damages served a number of functions, but none of
them were to provide the noneconomic damages identified by the court. Instead, as
the Article shows, the sort of injuries for which punitive damages were once de-
manded would still be uncompensated by contemporary doctrines of compensatory
damages. This Article uses the Court's confused analysis in Cooper to demonstrate
that the dichotomy upon which it relied-that, in the law of punitive damages, punish-
ment and compensation are mutually exclusive categories-is neither historically ac-
curate nor analytically necessary.
THE INCOHERENCE OF PUNISHMENT
IN ANTITRUST Spencer Weber Waller 207
Antitrust has a complex set of criminal and civil remedies enforced by a multiplic-
ity of public and private actors. Antitrust remedies are frequently analyzed from the
point of view of deterrence and compensation, but only rarely from the perspective of
punishment. The few debates about punishment concern whether defendants are
over-punished or under-punished. This Article analyzes a different question about
punishment in antitrust-namely that total punishment in any given antitrust case var-
ies dramatically for offenses with identical or similar status under the law and there is
no a prioi way to predict punishment levels for a particular case or a particular defen-
dant. This is the real but overlooked incoherence of antitrust punishment which has
real consequences both for antitrust and for tort scholars looking to antitrust as a
model of certainty in questions of punishment and damages.
CAN TORT JURIES PUNISH COMPETENTLY?
(REVIEW OF SUNSTEIN ET AL.,
PUNITIVE DAMAGES) Neal R. Feigenson 239
Punitive damages have prompted much academic and political debate during the
last twenty years. In their recent book Punitive Damages, Cass Sunstein, Reid Hastie,
John Payne, David Schkade, and W. Kip Viscusi present some twenty experimental
studies that, they argue, show that juries award punitive damages too often, that the
amounts they award are erratic and unpredictable, and that their decision-making
processes are prone to various cognitive biases and other irrationalities, displaying a
particular disregard of the principle of optimal deterrence. While the book offers
much reliable and valuable data on how juries think about punitive damages, the au-
thors frequently describe their results tendentiously, downplaying or omitting consid-
erations that would support alternative interpretations of the data. Most importantly,
by emphasizing deterrence to the exclusion of the retributive function that punitives
are widely thought to serve, the authors present an unduly pejorative picture of juries'
punitive damages decision making and overstate the need for reforming the process.
KENNETH M. PIPER LECTURE
IMMIGRATION AND THE WORKPLACE:
IMMIGRATION RESTRICTIONS AS
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION Howard F. Chang 291
In this article, I analyze restrictions on immigration to the United States as a form
of government-mandated employment discrimination against aliens. Through our im-
migration laws, we deny aliens access to valuable employment opportunities that are
open to natives. Under our immigration and nationality laws, we base this discrimina-
tion explicitly on circumstances of birth beyond our liberal ideals of equality, which
require a cosmopolitan perspective that extends equal concern to all individuals. Fur-
thermore, even if we assume a less demanding moral theory that allows us to give the
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new prisons. Because civil forfeiture encroaches upon an individual's use and posses-
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government to its proofs under a probable cause standard, and argues that the Su-
preme Court of the United States should have granted Dusenbery's petition for writ
of certiorari and reversed the Sixth Circuit's decision in Dusenbery because the rea-
sons the majority cites to buttress its holding have no foundation in the law.
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This Note, as one may surmise from the title, advocates a broader approach to
federal funding of human embryo stem cell research. It begins with a look at the
science of embryo stem cells and examines the medical promise that stem cell technol-
ogy holds. It also briefly addresses the controversy that surrounds embryo stem cells.
The Note then looks at why federal funding is so important to embryo stem cell re-
search and how federal funding for embryo stem cell research is currently handled.
Examination of current federal funding methodology leads to several concerns which
are addressed, including property rights, flight of scientists to greener pastures, limited
diversity of embryo stem cell lines, and xenotransplantation issues. The Note con-
cludes that while the current approach to federal funding of embryo stem cell research
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are going to fund embryo stem cell research, it should be done it a way that allows
those taxpayers to reap the maximum benefit from the research.
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Although the Federal Sentencing Guidelines have strived to standardize the sen-
tencing ranges applicable to similarly situated defendants, the Supreme Court has af-
firmed that the guidelines have not usurped all the sentencing discretion of trial
judges. Thus, if a trial judge notices a mitigating or aggravating factor, a judge will
examine the factor to determine whether it is an encouraged, discouraged, or forbid-
den departure ground and then decide whether and how it should affect the defen-
dant's sentence. Many defendants have argued that their cultural beliefs, which may
tend to mitigate their mens rea or probability of recidivism, render them distinct from
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mitigating factor when determining their sentence. Many judges have agreed that cul-
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their assimilation to American norms and mores warranted consideration. In stark
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hold our nation's ideals of cultural pluralism and diversity, and resolve this sentencing
disparity in favor of downward departures for cultural difference claims.
